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Avoidable Unfairness in Tax Law
and United States v. Burke
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tax laws are reputed to be unduly complicated. This complication is, of course, partly due to case law that is both confusing and excessive. However, as the recent Supreme Court
decision United States u. Burke 1 points out, the legislature has
greatly contributed to the general lack of understanding. The
following case note discusses this case and the issue of whether
back pay received for employment discrimination should be
taxed. Section II examines the background cases and statutes
which led up to Burke. Section III summarizes Burke. Section
IV points out Burke's shortcomings and offers a legislative
solution to consistent and fair treatment of victims of non-physical personal injury.
II.

BACKGROUND

On February 13, 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment was
ratified, giving the federal government the power to lay and
collect taxes on income. 2 Income is defined as "accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion."3 Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code
requires the taxation of income "from whatever source derived"
unless the item is specifically excluded. 4 It is from these rules
of law that taxable income is initially determined.
Section 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, the predecessor to section 104(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1989, excluded
from taxable income amounts received "on account of personal
injury."5 This exclusion has changed little since 1918.6 In fact,
the personal injury exclusion received very scant attention in

1.
2.

Keep
3.
4.
5.
6.

112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain, No Gain? Slwuld Personal Injury Damages
Their Tax Exempt Status? 9 U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L.J. 407, 413 (1986-87).
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (195fi).
26 U.S.C. § 61 (1988).
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988).
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early years because individual tax rates were low and taxpayers were few before the 1940's, thus dismissing a need for definitive legislation until taxes became significant. 7
Section 104(a)(2) was probably initially adopted to cover
only physical injury. 8 However, the courts throughout the
years have applied section 104(a)(2) to non-physical as well as
physical injuries. 9 This court-created extension, followed by
Congress' failure to amend section 104(a)(2), arguably constituted legislative endorsement of applying the personal injury
exclusion to physical and non-physical injuries. Consequently,
in 1970, the Treasury described personal injuries for section
104(a)(2) purposes to be those damages received from a case
"based upon tort or tort-type rights." 10 Thus it was established
that "personal injury" can apply to both physical and non-physical injuries. The issue has now arisen of whether back pay
awards for non-physical torts qualify for the section 104(a)(2)
exclusion. The section 104(a)(2) test for this issue is two-prong:
(1) is back pay from employment discrimination awards based
upon tort or tort-type rights 11 and (2) if the injury is nonphysical, is back pay punitive or compensatory. 12
The Tax Court has not had much opportunity to decide the
tax consequences of back pay damages received for employment
discrimination. However, the few cases have been decided with
confusion and inconsistency.
The first resolution of the issue held that damages received
from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were to be included in gross income. 13 The 1972 ruling found the damages to be
taxable because they were a substitute for taxable compensation. 14 This analysis will be referred to as the "in lieu of what"

7.
Robert J. Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury AwarcL~, 19 OHIO
ST. L.J. 212, 212 (19fiR) as cited in Lorraine S. Boss, Note, Taxation and Personal
Injury Awards: The Search for Workable Guidelines, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 628,
631-32 (1988).
8.
Mark W. Cochran, 1989 Tax Act Compounds Confusion over Tax Status of
Personal Injury Damages TAX NOTES, December 31, 1990, at 1565, 1568.
9.
!d.
10.
Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (amended 1970).
11.
!d.
12.
26 U.S.C. § 104 (19811 & Supp. I 1989).
13.
Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32. The I.R.S. held that because the payments to the employees were made by the corporation based on compensation that
they otherwise would have received, the amount of the payments are includable in
gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 61. !d.
14.
ld.
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test. It is often challenged by a test which examines the definition of "personal injury." This second test we will call the "nature of claim" standard.
The only other important decision on this issue prior to
1986 also adopted the "in lieu of what" standard. 15 Watkins v.
United States involved the taxation of a racial discrimination
employment award. 16 The Claims Court judged the back pay
award includable in gross income, ignoring the "nature of
claim" argument that racial discrimination constitutes a personal injury. 17
In the 1987 case Bent v. Commissioner, the Tax Court
decided, contrary to previous cases, that the taxability of the
award depends on the nature of the claim brought under the
violated statute. 18 Because the claim generally involved personal injury, the Tax Court held that the damages received
were excludable from gross income under 104(a)(2). 19 This decision directly opposed Watkins. On review, the Third Circuit
agreed with the Tax Court. 20 Since Bent had been compensated for a personal injury, even though the settlement included
lost wage compensation, the entire award was excluded under
section 104(a)(2). 21 Thus the "nature of claim" test was affirmed.
In 1988 Metzger v. Commissioner examined an employment
discrimination award to determine its taxation. 22 The Tax
Court, as in Watkins, agreed that the "nature of claim" test
determined back pay taxability. 23 The court reasoned that if
taxpayers' complained injuries are similar, the back pay should
be equally taxed despite different statutory remedies. 24 Since
Metzger's injury, employment discrimination, was similar to
other injuries where back pay was not taxed, the court held
that Metzger's back pay should be untaxed. 25

15.
Timothy R. Palmer, Note, Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2) and the
Exclusion of Personal Injury Damaf{es: A Model of Inconsistency, 15 J. CORP. L. 83,
106 (1989).
16.
22:~ Ct. Cl. 731 (1980).
ld. at 732-33.
17.
18.
87 T.C. 236 (1986).
ld. at 249.
19.
20.
Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
21.
!d. at 70.
22.
88 T.C. 834 (1987).
23.
ld. at 852.
24.
!d. at 85fi-fi9.
!d. at H5H.
2fi.
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In spite of Bent and Metzger's "nature of claim" endorsement, the Tax Court in the 1989 case Thompson v. Commissioner,26 chose the "in lieu of what" standard. 27 This case also
involved sex employment discrimination under Title VII. 28
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the "in lieu of what" test as the
appropriate touchstone. 29
Burke, the 1992 Supreme Court case, addressed the split in
the circuits and chose a "nature of claim" standard for determining personal damage taxation. 30 Burke was unique in that
it narrowed this test by closely examining the available damages of the cause of action.
III.

A.

SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES V.

BURKE

Facts

Therese A. Burke, along with fellow union employees, sued
Tennessee Valley Authority (T.V.A.) claiming sexual discrimination.31 Burke claimed that T.V.A. had increased employee
salaries in certain male-dominated pay schedules, but had not
similarly treated certain female-dominated pay schedules. 32
T.V.A. filed a counterclaim against the Union alleging, among
other things, fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract.33
In settlement, T.V.A. agreed to pay over $5,000,000 to be
distributed among affected employees. 34 T.V.A. withheld federal income taxes on Burke's allocated amount on the basis of the
"in lieu of what" standard. 35
Burke claimed entitlement to the withheld taxes arguing
that the back pay award was "received on account of personal
injuries or sickness," and so should not be taxed. 36 The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the claim, and Burke appealed
to the federal courts. 37

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

89 T.C. 632 (1987).
ld. at 646.
ld. at 632-33.
Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
112 S. Ct. at 1867.
ld. at 1868-69.
ld. at 1869.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

Id.
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B. District Court Ruling
The District Court ruled in favor of the government on the
"in lieu of what" theory since Burke sought and received only
back wages rather than compensatory or other damages. 38
Thus the settlement proceeds were not excludable from gross
income as "damages received ... on account of personal injuries."39

C.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the test for
section 104(a)(2) exclusion turns on the "nature of claim"
touchstone. 4° Finding that T.V.A.'s. discrimination constituted
a personal tort-like injury to Burke, the court found the back
pay not taxable. 41

D.

Supreme Court Ruling

The United States Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.42 Ironically, the Supreme Court also applied a "nature of
claim" test. 43
The Supreme Court found that the back pay was an accession to wealth and thus "income."44 The question then became
whether the back pay was excludable as "damages received ...
on account of personal injuries or sickness."45 The Court pointed out that since 1960, I.R.S. regulations have formally linked
section 104(a)(2) personal injuries to the existence of tort or
tort-type rights involved in the claim. 46 Thus, in agreement
with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court decided that if
the nature of the claim underlying Burke's damage award was
tort-like, then the back pay was excludable from incomeY

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
4fi.
46.
47.

ld.
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988).
Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121, 1124 (6th Cir. 1991).
ld. at 1121-23.
112 S. Ct. at 1874.
ld. at 1870-72.
ld. at 1870.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 1870-71.
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The Court accepted the definition of a "tort" as a "civil
wrong . . . for which the court will provide a remedy in the
form of an action for damages.'"' 8 The Court placed great emphasis on the remedies available in the involved statute. 49
The Court pointed out that harming individuals does not
necessarily establish a tort-like personal injury with respect to
tax treatment. 50 Instead, the crucial factor is that the claim
was brought under a statute which didn't allow "compensatory
or punitive" damages, but only "back pay, injunctions, and
other equitable relief." 51 The Court found that when damages
were excludable from income the claims were brought under
statutes that included recompense for: pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, etc. 52 These were found to
be traditional harms associated with personal injury. 53 Since
Title VII did not include these traditional harms, the Court
found its remedies in marked contrast with those remedies
available under traditional tort and federal anti-discrimination
statutes. 54 The Court thus held that a statute with only back
pay, injunction, and other equitable relief as available remedies
was not within the traditional tort-like category for tax purposes, and so Burke's back pay was not excludable from income. 55
IV.

DISCUSSION OF BURKE

Two problems with the section 104(a)(2) personal damage
exclusion are exemplified in Burke. First,. Congress' failure to
define "personal injury.'' Second, Congress' categorization of
tort damages as "punitive or compensatory." As the background
section indicated, courts have wavered between various forms
of the "nature of injury" test and the "in lieu of what" standard.
This inconsistency was caused greatly by Congress' imprecise
statute. The obstacles which the statute created, however, can
be avoided if the legislature amends section 104 to include both
the "nature of claim" and "in lieu of what" rationals.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
ld.
ld.
ld.
I d.
Id.
ld.

at 1870-72.
at 1872-73.
at 1873.
at 1874.

!d. at 1873-74.

365]

A

United States v. Burke

371

The Result of Not Carefully Defining "Personal Injury"

The "nature of claim" test as applied in Burke, when used
as the only touchstone, has two undesirable outcomes: (1) extreme dependence on state law and counsel's advice and (2)
unjustified unequal treatment of plaintiffs who have suffered
similar injuries. A broader version of Burke's "nature of claim"
test would overcome these problems.

1.

Two instances of unfairness

The initial problem with Burke's "nature of claim" test is
its reliance on state and federal statutes. 56 This reliance produces unequal treatment of equally injured taxpayers. Rather
than the merits of the victims claims being the touchstone, a
Burke-like "nature of claim" test turns on where or in which
state the plaintiffs reside or were hurt, as well as how welladvised the plaintiffs are in making their initial claims, drawing up their settlement agreement, and choosing to sue in a
particular state. 57 If two identically hurt victims recover, different tax treatment of their recoveries is unjust and should be
avoided.
Burke's heavy reliance on statutory listings of remedies
increases tax unfairness. 58 As a concurring opinion in Burke
stated, "there are definite parallels between ... a defamation
action, which vindicates the plaintiffs interest in [a] good name
[which is not taxed], and a Title VII suit, which ... vindicates
an interest in dignity as a human being entitled to be judged
on individual merit [which under Burke is taxed]."59 To tax
one victim, and not the other, when the injury is inherently
similar, is unjust.

2. A better interpretation of "personal injury"
Burke's dissent analysis offers a better "nature of claim"
application. It suggests that a critical factor in deciding if an
injury is tort or tort-like is whether the tort is closer to a con-

56.
!d. at 1872.
fi7.
Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developin,:; a Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14
WM. MITCHELL 1. REV. 759, 762 (1988).
fi8.
112 S. Ct. at 18n.
fi9.
!d. at 1877.
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tractual right interference or a personal right interference. 60
This interpretation of "personal injury" and "tort-like action"
doesn't rely on inflexible statutes and looks instead at the reality of the victim's harm. Thus, this wider construction avoids
the inequitable results of Burke's analysis.
B.

The New Definition Applied

Although the above suggestion produces fairer results than
Burke's test, its direct application results in excluding back pay
from taxable income. For non-physical injuries, this outcome is
inconsistent with legislative intent.

1. Logical result of the new definition
Once the claim is found to be a personal injury with the
suggested "nature of claim" test, the harm must then be classified as physical or non-physical. This distinction is extremely
significant since the legislature probably meant for physical
injuries to receive preferential treatment.
In sexual discrimination cases, such as Burke, non-physical
injury is involved. Congress, with the 1989 amendment, eliminated the exclusion of "punitive damages in connection with a
case not involving physical injury or sickness."61 The logical
inference of the 1989 amendment is that only non-punitive
damages are excludable from income for sexual discrimination
cases. The question then becomes: Is back pay punitive or nonpunitive?
Popular definitions of compensatory damages and punitive
damages do not clearly dictate the tax treatment of back pay.
Compensatory damages are those damages which make the
taxpayer whole from a previous loss of personal rights. 62 Punitive damages are defined as either (1) those damages that are
to punish the defendant63 or (2) those damages over and above
the amount necessary to restore the taxpayer's loss. 64
Back pay, when strictly applied to the above definitions,
can cause strange conclusions. For example, assume the tax-

60.
ld. at 1880.
61.
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F. 2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990).
62.
Chapman, supra note 2, at 428.
63.
64.
Mary J. Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Wrong Rule: The
I.R.S. Demands a Return on All Punitive Damages, 17 CONN. L. REV. 39, 94
(1984).
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payer received $1500 in a back pay damage award, which represents $1000 take home pay and $500 tax (assume for simplicity taxpayer is in a 33% tax bracket). This is how the $1500
would have been distributed if she had not been discriminated
against but normally paid without a lawsuit. Applying the
above definitions, $1000 represents compensatory damages
because this amount makes the taxpayer whole. If the first
definition of punitive damages is applied, then none of the
award represents punitive damages, since back pay does not
punish the defendant. Defendant simply has to reimburse the
plaintiff. He has lost nothing in the "gamble" of discrimination.
Thus the taxpayer would not be taxed on the $500, although it
is not compensatory.
If the second punitive damage definition is applied, however, since $1000 fully compensates the victim, then $500 represents damages over and above the amount necessary to restore
the plaintiffs loss. Thus, if the victim of a non-physical personal injury is to be taxed on punitive, but not compensatory damages, the victim could arguably be taxed only on the $500 (instead of the entire $1500). This would be approximately $165.
However, if the plaintiff had never been discriminated against,
she would have been taxed $500. Thus, even under the most
inclusive punitive damage definition, the plaintiff could gain
$335. Thus the section 104(a)(2) exclusion, when logically followed, can result in a tax advantage to non-physical personal
injury victims.

2. Not taxing back pay from non-physical injury is inconsistent with legislative intent
Tax equity requires that persons with the same income
should pay the same amount of tax regardless of the source of
the income. 6 " It follows that a person who receives pay from
uncontested work, and one who receives pay from contested
work should both pay the same amount of tax, unless the legislature decides otherwise. 66 Thus section 104(a)(2) must be
examined to determine if Congress intended to give the above
preferential tax treatment to non-physical injury back pay
awards.

6fi.
Michael J. Graetz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLITIES 17
(2d ed. l9HH).
66.
Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 63fi, 636 (N. D. Ala. 19R6).
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a. Legislative intent of section 104. As previously discussed, in 1989 Congress implied that for physical injuries, all
damage awards, including otherwise taxable items such as
back pay, were tax-free. 67 This special treatment did not extend to non-physical injury damages, since punitive damages
are not excludable when in connection with a case not involving
physical injury or sickness. 611 Since the legislature seems to
classify all damages as either compensatory or punitive, and
since punitive damages are taxable, it follows that the legislature meant for only compensatory damages to be tax free when
a non-physical injury is involved. 69 Compensatory damages
are those damages that make the taxpayer whole from a previous loss of personal rights. 70 The law for non-physical torts,
then, was meant to fully compensate the victim for her injury,
i.e., to make her "whole." 71 There was no desire to put her in
a better position than she was before the injury. 72
b. Is the taxpayer made whole? The correct inquiry then
is whether, if the taxpayer is taxed on the damage award, he
will still be made whole. 73 This question follows the reasoning of the "in lieu of what" test, which looks at individual damages and asks if the money replaces a taxable or non-taxable
status? As long as the taxpayer is merely made whole, the
money replaces a non-taxable status.
To illustrate the concept of a tort victim being made
"whole" the example of a plaintiff who loses his leg is often
given. 74 For simplicity, we will assume that the injury did not
result in lost wages or loss of earning capacity. If the plaintiff
receives $500,000 for a leg, he has been restored, if only by a
monetary payment, to the position he held before the accident. 75 The money recovered has theoretically compensated
the victim for the value of being physically whole - the value of

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).

!d.
!d.

Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F. 2d fiR6, fi90 (4th Cir. 1990).
Malcolm L. Morris, TaxinR Economic Loss Recovered in Personal Injury Ac·
tions: Toward.., a Capital Ideal, aR U. FLA. L. REV. nH, 745 (19H6).
!d.
72.
n. Chapman, supra, note 2, at 42R.
Brooks, supra note 5n, at 770.
74.
!d.
75.
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having a leg. 76
A similar analysis applies for one who, in a discrimination
case, has lost her dignity as a human being entitled to be
judged on individual merit. The money designated to compensate the victim for the loss of this dignity theoretically restores
her to the position she would have occupied without the injury,
i.e., the money makes her whole. The use of money to replace
what is lost does not justify imposing tax on a person who has
simply been restored to a status others enjoy tax-free. 77 Thus
damages for pain and suffering, emotional harm, etc., should
not be taxed. If the victim is taxed on these damage awards,
she will be made less than whole.
Lost earnings, however, are different. Back pay compensates the plaintiff for taxable earnings he should have received.
"If the earnings had been received, they would have been taxable as ordinary income. Thus the past earnings portion of the
settlement appears to be an includable substitute for ordinary
income."78 If taxpayer is taxed on the back pay award, he will
still be made whole. This "in lieu of what" or "wholeness" test
should become a part of section 104(a)(2) in order to avoid the
present confusion that compensatory and punitive definitions
cause.

3.

The solution

As pointed out earlier, Congress seemed to intend the result, although not the analysis of Burke. The problem in Burke
of interpreting tax codes is an inherent problem of unspecific
law.
The "nature of claim" and "in lieu of what" touchstones
both illustrate important concepts of tax equity. These standards together should form a congressionally mandated twoprong test for the 104(a)(2) exclusion.
The "nature of claim" standard initially should screen the
cases. The non-physical injury cases that pass this first test
should then be scrutinized by the "in lieu of what" test to determine whether, if taxed on the non-physical damage award, the
plaintiff will still be made whole.

76.
77.
78.

!d.
!d. at 7RO.
!d. at 775.
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CONCLUSION

Burke and its historical background illustrate the inconsistency and unfairness of the personal injury exclusion. To avoid
continuing these problems, the legislature should amend and
clarify section 104(a)(2). Both the "nature of claim" and "in lieu
of what" touchstones should be adopted in the modified exclusion so that the legislative intent of section 104(a)(2) can at last
be realized.
Lisa Kay Norton

